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Abstract: There is limited theoretical understanding and empirical evidence for how 
international new ventures legitimate. Drawing from legitimation theory, this study fills in 
this gap by exploring how international new ventures legitimate and strive for survival in 
the face of critical events during the process of their emergence. It is a longitudinal, 
multiple-case study research that employs critical incident technique for data collection, 
analysis, and interpretation. Following theory driven sampling, five international new 
ventures were selected that were operating in the software sector in the UK, and had 
internationalized and struggled for survival during the dotcom era. Grounded in data, this 
study corroborates a number of legitimation strategies yielded by prior research and refutes 
others. It further contributes to our understanding of international new venture legitimation 
by suggesting new types of legitimation strategies: technology, operating, and anchoring. 
Studying international new ventures through theoretical lenses of legitimation is a 
promising area of research that would contribute to the advancement of international 
entrepreneurship theory. 
Keywords: international new venture; legitimation; dotcom; case study; theory building; 
international entrepreneurship 
 
1. Introduction 
We view international new ventures (INVs) as ventures that have no prior corporate history in the 
industry and no prior presence in international markets [1]. During the process of their emergence, 
INVs usually experience three types of liabilities—newness, smallness, and foreignness—that either 
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individually, or in combination, can increase the risk of INVs‘ potential failure [2]. Such ventures 
overcome these kinds of liabilities when they become legitimate [3–7].  
Legitimacy is approached as ―a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, beliefs, and 
definitions‖ ([8], p. 574). Undertaking activities to generate legitimacy both enhances new venture 
survival and facilitates the transition to other forms of organizing activities [9]. The acquisition of 
legitimacy or the failure to legitimate has a differentiated effect on INVs that is expressed as 
legitimacy threshold ―… below which the new venture struggles for existence and probably will perish 
and above which the new venture can achieve further gains in legitimacy and resources‖ ([6], p. 427). 
A number of reviews have been recently conducted that provide an excellent account of the status 
of the emerging field of international entrepreneurship [10–14]. The findings from these reviews 
highlight, inter alia, the importance of overcoming liabilities of newness, smallness, and foreignness 
for INVs, and point to the scarcity of extant research on INV legitimation. With this paper we fill in 
this gap by furthering our understanding of INV legitimation by exploring in depth how INVs acquire 
legitimacy and strive for survival in the face of critical events during the process of their emergence. In 
this quest, we draw from legitimation theory.  
Driven by the nature of the research question, as well as by the urge to advance our theoretical 
understanding of INV legitimation, we adopt a longitudinal multiple-case study methodology [15]. To 
capture the above-mentioned differentiated effects, we employ the critical incident technique to 
collect, analyze, and interpret the data [16–18]. We define an event as critical when it deviates 
significantly, either positively or negatively, from what is normal or expected [19].  
Grounded in data, we corroborate a number of legitimation strategies yielded by prior research and 
refute others. At the same time, we further contribute to our understanding of INV legitimation by 
suggesting new types of legitimation strategies, mainly technology, operating, and anchoring. 
Additionally, we develop a set of tools and techniques to research critical incidents in INVs.  
We continue the paper by positioning INVs within legitimation theory. We then present the 
methodology and methods employed to address the research question. Findings are presented and 
discussed next. We conclude the paper by proposing an agenda for future research to advance 
international entrepreneurship literature in the area of INV legitimation. 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Positioning and Contextualizing the Research  
We draw from legitimation theory in order to position INV legitimation research. We put forward a 
typology of legitimation (Figure 1) by cross-tabulating two research streams that emerge from legitimation 
literature. The typology of legitimation is built following the method of constructing typologies by 
reduction [20]. According to Glaser [20], all typologies are based on differentiating criteria, e.g., being 
internal or external to a concept, or being delineated by its dimensions or degrees. Constructing a 
typology by reduction is achieved by cross-tabulating the internal or external distinction of a concept. 
For example, one dimension might represent the life continuum of a firm: young vs. old; start-up vs. 
established; success vs. failure; or still in business vs. out of business. The other dimension might be 
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related to a unit of analysis and represent its continuum by using appropriate coding families [20] or 
logical simplification [21], e.g., total vs. partial; dependent vs. independent; or uncertainty vs. risk. One 
research stream deals with the state of the venture—emergent vs. established, hence, the creation and 
legitimation of new ventures, and the maintenance of legitimacy in already established ventures [22]. 
Another research stream looks at the state of the industry the venture operates in—emergent vs. 
established, hence, legitimation of ventures in emergent and established industries [4].  
Figure 1. Typology of legitimation. 
 
The research on INV legitimation is positioned within quadrants I and II (Figure 1). Researchers 
doing research in quadrant I and II may delve into how these ventures (be these independent start-ups 
or intrapreneurship ventures) create and legitimate themselves in an attempt to reach the legitimacy 
threshold. The research in quadrant I is characterized by uncertain decision-making settings, whereas 
the research in quadrant II—by risk decision-making settings. The difference between the two is that in 
the former, the possible outcomes of decisions to pursue an opportunity, and the probability of those 
outcomes, are unknown [23]. An example of such uncertain decision-making settings is the dotcom 
era, during which decisions were made under conditions of technology and market uncertainty as well 
as goal ambiguity [24–27].  
Researchers conducting research in quadrant III are concerned with how established ventures 
maintain their legitimacy or the status quo [22], or defend their legitimacy [28]. For example,  
well-established ventures may build legitimacy-based barriers to entry into their domain by changing 
the relative importance of legitimacy dimensions, raising the legitimacy threshold, and altering the 
perceptions of competitors‘ performance. In quadrant IV, researchers might inquire into how 
established ventures defend their legitimacy when the market they operate in is in a state of emergence, 
for example, when it is disrupted by the introduction of radical innovation or new organizational 
forms, or a new social order. In the face of such threats, such ventures have the options of trying to 
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defend their status quo [28] or to de-legitimize [29] their existing practices to conform to new realities. 
Researchers here may also study how established ventures create and legitimate their products or services 
in international emerging markets, or even how new industries or sectors of an economy are created.  
The focus of the present study is on how INVs create and legitimate themselves in markets that are 
also in the process of emergence; hence, this study is positioned within quadrant I of Figure 1. A 
representative example of such uncertain decision-making settings is the dotcom period [27] that 
provides the context for the present study.  
During the dotcom boom, the future prospects, sometimes even exaggerated [25], of a technology, 
an innovation, a market, or a product gave birth to several myths regarding the new economy, including the 
business cycle is dead or business decisions could ignore old rules about the marketplace [30,31]. 
Many believed that the Internet would have major impact on global business by 2001 [32]. Visionary 
predictions of the e-business, like brands will die, prices will fall, and middlemen will die were driving 
the valuation of virtual firms to the level of an Internet Bubble [24] that burst in 2000. 
In such environments as dotcom, entrepreneurs and their stakeholders have difficulties in 
understanding the nature of INVs, in making realistic predictions about the growth potential of the 
markets, and in learning and adjusting their behaviors as industries emerge. Moreover, entrepreneurs‘ 
concerns are not only about legitimizing their international ventures, but also about contributing to the 
creation and the establishment of new technical norms and new cognitive patterns of behavior [33].  
2.2. International New Venture Legitimation  
The extant research on INV legitimation is in its embryonic stage. Recent attempts to explore this 
intersection highlighted a number of challenges that await entrepreneurs in the process of INV 
legitimation [7,33–35]. How legitimacy and identity are constructed over time, and whether the 
legitimacy threshold is ever reached are considered major challenges in INVs research [7]. During 
their lifetime, INVs go through various types of behavior, and recurrent activities and patterns of 
interaction, in order to legitimize, as well as undergo a changing context within which the venture 
struggles to reach the legitimacy threshold. For example, INVs‘ members may use their position in the 
venture to promote their preferred agendas, thereby exposing them to both opportunities and risks [7]. 
On one hand, the diversity of different behaviors may lead to consent over the identity of the venture 
and an alignment of internal and external legitimacy; on the other hand, it may lead to contested 
identities and a misalignment of the legitimation process. Drori et al. ([7], p. 734) conclude that 
internal legitimacy is critical to construct a sufficiently robust nascent organizational culture and to 
enhance creative activity, while external legitimacy is necessary for the acquisition of resources and 
the attraction of customers and clients. 
INVs seek to mitigate liabilities of newness, smallness and foreignness by partnering or affiliating 
with highly regarded organizations [34,35]. Such partnerships or alliances allow INVs to enter 
international markets, enhance their market position and authority, acquire resources and skills, as well 
as mitigate the risks associated with rapid internationalization—eventually leading to INV legitimation 
and legitimation threshold. However, such partnerships are not always successfully implemented, as 
Groen et al. [34] found, due to tensions within the entrepreneurial team, disappointments and 
inefficiencies in running the venture, loss of application opportunities due to the alliance breakdown, 
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delay in bringing the technology to the market due to insufficient funding, or lack of support from the 
network. By forming such partnerships or alliances, INVs may find themselves in captivity as a captive 
industry supplier, captive dyadic partner, or captive market leader [35]—a state that may decrease the 
likelihood INV survivability. According to Turcan [35], the dynamics in the relationship between the 
captive INV and its reputable partner may also change when INV potential is realized, i.e., legitimacy 
threshold is reached: INV may exit the partnership and continue on its own, including through an IPO; 
it can be internalized by its partner, or acquired by another organization. 
Recently, Turcan and Fraser [33] explored the process of emergence of an INV from an emerging 
economy and the effect such venture has on the process of industry creation in that economy. Turcan 
and Fraser [33] found that in order for an INV to achieve legitimacy in an emerging industry located in 
an emerging economy, and successfully internationalize, it shall design a robust business model 
targeting both internal and external stakeholders, engage in persuasive argumentation invoking 
familiar cues and scripts, engage in political negotiations promoting and defending incentive and 
operating mechanisms, and overcome the country-of-origin effect by legitimating their technology. In 
the context of new industry emergence, such INV legitimation efforts are also directed towards 
changing and creating new structural meanings that helped the new, emerging industry reach what 
Turcan and Fraser [33] call industry legitimation threshold. 
2.3. New Venture Legitimation  
Given that the extant knowledge regarding the legitimation process in INVs is relatively scant, we 
turn to the literature on new venture legitimation in an attempt to identify concepts and theoretical 
perspectives that might be applicable to INV legitimation (within quadrants I and II, Figure 1); for a 
comprehensive review of legitimation strategies literature, please refer to Turcan et al. [36].  
The process of new venture emergence can be understood and predicted by viewing it as a quest for 
legitimacy [37] during which a new venture seeks different strategies to establish or build legitimacy [4]. 
Zott and Huy [38] suggest grouping legitimation strategies of new ventures into four symbolic 
legitimation strategies: credibility, defined as personal capability and personal commitment to the 
venture; professional organizing, defined as professional structures and processes; organizational 
achievement, defined as partially-working products and technologies, venture age, and number  
of employees; and quality of stakeholder relationships, defined as prestigious stakeholders, and 
personal attention. 
Hargadon and Douglas [39] introduce the notion of robust design and argue that robust design 
mediates between legitimized design and technical innovation, reduces the uncertainty linked to the 
new activity, and ensures that the main stakeholders would consider the new activity legitimate. 
According to Hargadon and Douglas [39], the major challenge for the entrepreneurs lies in finding 
familiar cues that locate and describe new ideas without binding the new venture‘s stakeholders too 
closely to the old ways of doing things. That is, as new technologies emerge, entrepreneurs and 
innovators must find the balance between novelty and familiarity, between impact and acceptance. An 
interesting finding emerged in the research by Wilson and Stokes [40] who found that the most 
appropriate legitimation strategy available to new ventures is the manipulation strategy. 
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The extant research on legitimation points to external and internal legitimacy, and suggests the 
positive effect of external and internal legitimacy on new ventures‘ growth and survival [9,41–43]. It 
also points to the fact that external and internal legitimacy are interdependent, rather than  
independent [41]. New ventures can acquire external legitimacy by associating or partnering with 
successful and established external entities. Extant research suggests that new ventures that acquire 
legitimacy externally by forming alliances with established firms gain more from their new products 
than new ventures that did not form such alliances [42].  
Internal legitimacy can be acquired by new ventures through four types of actions: market, 
scientific, locational, and historical [42]. It has to be noted that, in their paper, Rao et al. [42] apply the 
concept of ‗new venture‘ to ‗new product introduction‘, that is, the emergence of a new venture in an 
established market (quadrant II, Figure 1); in spite of this, for the purpose of this paper, their model of 
legitimation strategies is an informative one. Through market legitimacy, new ventures are trying to 
convey to their stakeholders that they have the market-based capabilities to operate effectively in their 
market. This could be achieved, for example, by appointing a non-executive director with prior 
experience in this or similar industries. Scientific legitimacy is about signaling to the stakeholders that 
the new venture has the technology-based capabilities needed to operate in the industry. Here, 
recruiting eminent scientists could be one of the options. Locational legitimacy conveys to the 
stakeholders that the new venture is capable of deriving a differential advantage from its geographical 
location. Finally, through historical legitimacy, new ventures are trying to communicate the prospects 
of future performance on the basis of their past performance to their stakeholders. As per our definition 
of INVs provided above, this type of legitimacy has limited applicability to INVs as these ventures 
have no prior (corporate) history. 
In their efforts to gain legitimacy, new ventures‘ ideas change under various external pressures, 
such as customers, competitors, investors, suppliers, and incubators [42]. Davidsson et al. [44] found 
that that the amount of change and the external pressure to change is greater after the start-up phase 
than in the pre-start-up, formative stage. These authors further suggest that more changes of the 
venture idea are also to be expected in situations when these new ventures depend on external finance, 
rely on a dominant player, and are located in incubators.  
Such legitimation activities become critical, since, in their pursuit for legitimacy, entrepreneurs face 
conflicting expectations about fitting in with the established rules on one hand, and the need to stand 
out as a rule breaker in order to differentiate themselves on the other [45]. However, there is a lack of 
empirical research regarding the examination of the process taking place in INVs in terms of the rapid 
and short life span, as well as how the initial conditions of their founding generate external and internal 
legitimacy [7]. This paper aims to address this gap by exploring how INVs acquire legitimacy during 
the process of their emergence. 
3. Research Methodology  
Given the limited theory and evidence for how INVs legitimate, we adopted a longitudinal  
multiple-case study methodology for the purpose of theory building [15]. We explore how INVs 
acquire legitimacy and strive for survival in the face of critical events during the process of their 
emergence. Following a theory driven sampling (quadrant I, Figure 1), we purposefully selected five 
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INVs for the study. Table 1 provides a brief summary of the cases; for confidentiality reasons, 
interviewees‘ and companies‘ names are disguised throughout the paper. 
Further sampling criteria were developed in order to select case companies as well as the empirical 
setting of the study. First, quadrant I in Figure 1 informed us of the need to look for INVs that were 
emerging in a new, emerging industry. Second, we used the internationalization gap to define an 
international new venture. The internationalization gap is the time that elapses from the emergence of a 
new venture until the moment of its internationalization; e.g., an internationalization gap of zero would 
denote instant internationalization. Third, since three out of five case companies have ceased trading, it 
became imperative to control for attribution errors, which are defined as a pattern whereby people tend 
to take credit for positive outcomes and attribute negative outcomes to external factors [46]. Indeed, 
one of the challenges when researching critical events, especially those that deviate negatively from 
what is normal or expected, is to control for such attribution errors.  
In the present study, we controlled for attribution errors by confining the study to a homogeneous 
empirical context. By doing so, it allowed us to control for the effect of the external environment on 
selected cases, such as legislation, market size, market structure across industries and countries, and 
the effect of time. In the present study, the sampled INVs were operating in the software sector in the 
UK, and had internationalized and struggled for survival during the dotcom era between 1999 and 
2003, inclusive. The potential effect of resource bias was also controlled for by defining a small 
venture as a venture having less than 100 employees [47]. To further minimize the potential effect of 
attribution errors, data collected from entrepreneurs were corroborated by data collected from their 
stakeholders and secondary sources; data collection and triangulation are summarized in Table 2. 
Data Collection and Analysis  
Data were collected from entrepreneurs/owners, and corroborated by data collected from their 
stakeholders, such as investors, strategic advisors, liquidators, policy makers, and business journalists, 
in four phases from 2000 through 2005. On average, an interview lasted approximately sixty minutes. 
All interviews were recorded with the interviewee‘s permission, and transcribed verbatim immediately 
afterward. The interviews were semi-structured in the form of guided conversations; to ensure some 
comparativeness between the responses, and allow sufficient control over the interview in order to ensure 
that the research objectives were met, an interview guide was designed. Twenty-four semi-structured,  
in-depth interviews were conducted yielding approximately 150 pages of interview data.  
Databases were created for each case with the aim of organizing and documenting the data 
collected, including primary and secondary data, thus enhancing the reliability of the research. The use 
of secondary data was primarily seen as a means to thoroughly prepare for the fieldwork, especially 
when studying critical events. Such an opportunity to get access to an entrepreneur with such 
(perceived as negative) experience was seen as potentially unique; therefore, it was deemed that as 
much as possible should be learned about the entrepreneur and the company before the interview. 
Secondary data were also used to detect potential cases on the bases of sampling selection criteria, to 
identify potential stakeholders who could corroborate the consistency of the information reported by 
interviewees, and to compare and cross-check written and published evidence with what interview 
respondents had reported.  
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Table 1. Summary of case companies. 
Case 
Company 
Business 
Description 
Founded 
(Year) 
Mode of 
Founding 
Emergence of New 
Business Idea 
Gone 
International 
Growth 
Path 
Number of  
Employees (at its Peak) 
Performance 
Finance-
Software 
B2B platforms 
for financial 
service industry 
1996 
Management 
buy-out 
1998 1998 
Organic 
growth 
60 
Product at least 12 months  
to soon to the market  
Ceased trading in 2004 
Project-
Software 
Tools to estimate 
project costs 
1992 Start-up 1995 1997 
VC 
backed 
12 
Liquidated in 2001;  
bought IP from liquidator  
Resurrected as Phoenix in 2001 
Tool-
Software 
Tools to estimate 
and test smart 
cards 
1985 Start-up 1993 1995 
Organic 
growth 
130 
Smart-card technology adopted 
globally in 1995 
Moved to profitability in 1995 
Mobile-
Software 
Platform to 
integrate mobile 
workforce data 
to HQ 
2000 Start-up 2000 2000 
VC 
backed 
105 
Were behind revenues and 
platform development in 2001  
Ceased trading in 2002 
Data-
Software 
Data warehouse 
to convert data 
into information 
1998 Spin-out 1998 1999 
VC 
backed 
40 
The strategic partner  
announced similar market 
development plans in 2000 
Ceased trading in 2001 
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Table 2. Data collection and triangulation. 
Phase 1 
1
 
2000 
Phase 2 
2001–2003 
Phase 3 
2004 
Phase 4 
2005 
 Leader of internationalization team, 
Scottish Trade International 2 
 Leader of software team, Scottish 
Trade International  3 
 Marketing Director of  
Finance-Software 
 CEO of Project-Software 
 Marketing Director of  
Finance-Software 
 Leader of software team, Scottish 
Trade International  
 Leader of internationalization team, 
Scottish Trade International  
 CEO of Project-Software 
 Business correspondent 4 
 Leader of software team, Scottish 
Trade International  
 Liquidator 5 
 CEO of Project-Software 
 Venture Capitalist 6 
 Marketing Director of  
Finance-Software 
 CEO of Mobile-Software 
 CEO of Finance-Software 
 CEO of Data-Software 
 Board member of Scottish 
Enterprise 7  
 CEO of Project-Software 
 CEO of Finance-Software 
 Business strategy consultant 8 
 Liquidator 
 CEO of Data-Software 
1 Interviewees are listed in the order they were interviewed; 2 The internationalization team at Scottish Trade International was assisting small and medium companies in 
their internationalization efforts; 3 The software team at Scottish Trade International focused on coordinating the internationalization efforts of Scottish software firms; 4 
This business correspondent was working for the ‗Business a.m.‘ newspaper and was responsible for tracking the evolution of nineteen ‗next generation‘ entrepreneurs 
who were involved in various high-technology start-ups. The case companies were among those nineteen; 5 This liquidator was appointed as a receiver to Project-
Software; 6 This venture capitalist invested in Project-Software and Data-Software and rejected funding to Tool-Software; 7 Scottish Enterprise is the Scotland‘s economic, 
enterprise, innovation and investment agency; 8 This business strategy consultant consulted Tool-Software. 
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Data were collected and analyzed following the critical incident technique (CIT) that has its origins 
in the research undertaken by Flanagan [16]. CIT is defined as ―... a qualitative interview procedure that 
facilitates the investigation of significant occurrences (events, incidents, processes, or issues) identified 
by respondents, the way they are managed, and the outcomes in terms of perceived effects‖ ([17], p. 56). 
CIT guidelines for in-depth interviewing were followed in all interviews [16,17]. The first step in the 
data analysis process, according to CIT, is to describe the incidents [16]. As maintained by Dubin [21], 
the very essence of description is to name the properties of things, and the more adequate the 
description, the greater the likelihood that the concepts derived from the description will be useful in 
subsequent theory building.  
The exploration and description of each case were centered on critical events and had the inception 
of the company as a point of departure. The summaries of critical events for each case are presented in 
the Appendix. The process of coding was driven by the constructs derived from the literature, such as, 
market legitimacy and technology legitimacy, as well as by open, substantive coding. Quotes from 
interviews were used extensively to illustrate the events, incidents, processes and issues that had, to 
various degrees, had an impact on the process of legitimization. In parallel, theoretical memos were 
developed while transcribing and coding in NVivo. 
The second step in the data analysis as per CIT is to choose a frame of reference so that it makes it 
easier and more accurate to classify and analyze the data. Initially, the locale of events [48] was 
identified, namely the entrepreneur, firm, home market, and international market levels. Then, four 
distinct time periods were identified that helped mapping the chronological flow of critical events, 
namely the emergence of new international business ideas, international expansion, a critical juncture, 
and beyond it.  
The above frames were structured in NVivo around the event-listing matrix format that allowed a 
good look at what led to what, when, and why [48]. The content of the event-listing matrix emerged 
after the initial ‗free coding‘ or open coding [20] for each case was completed, and each case was 
explored and described in detail. The third step in the data analysis is category formulation, which 
represents an induction of categories from the basic data in the form of incidents [16]. During this 
process, the analysis moved from open codes through to theoretical codes.  
The last step in data analysis, according to CIT, is to determine the most appropriate level of 
specificity-generality to use in reporting the data. In this study, middle-range theorizing helped manage 
the complexity of data. According to Weick ([49], p. 521), middle-range theories are solutions to 
problems that contain a limited number of assumptions and considerable accuracy and detail in the 
problem specification. This approach led to the emergence of a framework of INV legitimation 
presented in Table 3. Grounded in data, six legitimation strategies emerged that INVs pursue in their 
quest for legitimacy (Table 3). Four of these, namely market, technology, locational, and operating 
legitimation strategies, relate to the process of acquiring internal legitimacy, whereas the remaining 
two, anchoring and alliance, relate to the process of gaining external legitimacy. 
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Table 3. International new venture legitimation. 
 
Technology  
Legitimation Strategy 
Market  
Legitimation Strategy 
Operating  
Legitimation Strategy 
Locational  
Legitimation Strategy 
Alliance  
Legitimation Strategy 
Anchoring  
Legitimation Strategy 
Aim 
To validate the 
innovation/know-how 
To better understand the 
target market 
To have an optimal 
organizational gestalt 
To overcome the 
disadvantage of 
foreignness 
To mitigate the risk of 
newness and smallness 
To intentionally 
misrepresent the facts 
Target 
Large enterprise 
players 
Board of directors 
Potential customers 
Potential investors 
(chiefly) 
Potential customers 
Potential investors 
Large enterprise players Potential investors 
Means 
‗Built-in‘ capability 
Certification  
Recruiting key 
personnel 
Non-executive directors  
Strategic advisors 
Large consulting firms 
VCs 
Referrals (weak ties) 
Establish an office 
Hire employees 
Develop internal policy 
and operating procedures 
Develop incentive 
mechanisms 
Attract customers 
Generate first sale 
Get business education 
Procedural justice 
Locate venture‘s  
office abroad 
International cooperative 
agreements 
Partnerships 
Joint-ventures 
Asymmetry of 
information 
Hype business plans 
Accentuate positive and 
downplay negative 
Stretching the rules 
(Perceived) benefits  
Recognition  
Credibility 
Capability 
Market-related capabilities 
Efficient 
Professional 
Local venture 
Potential for very  
high gains 
Possibility of early exit 
strategies  
Look big 
Increased visibility, 
reputation, image, and 
prestige 
Likelihood to attract 
various types of investors 
Look big 
Increased likelihood to 
attract venture funding 
Challenges 
To find early adopters 
willing to try new 
technology 
Loss of control 
Goal misalignment 
To set and commit to 
long-term outcome goals 
To develop performance 
benchmarks  
Risk of goal misalignment 
Services do not travel, 
hence the need to develop 
a product-based business 
Internationalization 
dimension imposed by 
investors  
Loss of control over own 
fate (as large enterprise 
players, alliance partners 
demand exclusive 
partnerships, hence 
captive partnership) 
Ethical considerations 
Diminishing funding 
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4. Findings  
4.1. Technology Legitimation Strategy 
During the process of opportunity emergence, entrepreneurs are primarily concerned with 
technology legitimacy, which pertains to how to validate an innovation that has been created to meet a 
need or solve a problem. This is in line with Johnson et al.‘s [22] view of the legitimation process 
whereby the first stage in this process is concerned with the process of the emergence of an innovation. 
According to the data, technology legitimacy is, in a way, ‗built-in‘ to the INV as owners/ 
entrepreneurs have the technological, engineering, and scientific capability and credibility required to 
successfully research and develop the product. As entrepreneurs explained:  
―… technical credibility really; we have one key developer; my co-owner and I are involved in 
the product architecture development.‖—CEO of Project-Software. 
―We span-out; prior to that we built advanced systems for a number of multinational companies, 
and in the meantime developed an IP. I left that company with a small team and IP and set up 
Data-Software. It was a service-based business. My ambition was to create a product-based 
business from that.‖—CEO of Data-Software. 
Owners‘/entrepreneurs‘ capability and credibility are enhanced in situations where INVs emerge 
out of service-led businesses, thus bringing earlier success from a service-led business to the forefront 
of a newly emerging product-led or hybrid business model-based venture. In addition to the above,  
the data point to the recruitment of key personnel as another way of legitimizing new technology  
or innovation:  
―When we adopted new technology, we did have to bluff quite a lot. We recruited people from 
banks and insurance companies; so, we gradually brought in the industry knowledge that we 
ourselves did not have. But when our potential customers decided to use this new technology, 
the fact that we did not come from financial service was less important to them; important to 
them was that we knew this technology.‖—CEO of Finance-Software. 
―We did a project for a large computer and mobile manufacturer, and we were left with the 
software, and decided to do something with it, for example develop it as a tool. We created a 
tool, the next step then was to see where it can be used, and started hunting out key players.‖ 
—CEO of Tool-Software. 
The data further point to certification by large organizations as another activity aimed at validating 
the new technology. Through certification, INVs achieve two primary goals. One, they acquire 
recognition and credibility as being capable of successfully applying the new technology in the 
marketplace. And two, they gain hands-on experience in how to design, develop and implement the 
new technology, as was the case of Finance-Software:  
―We became an authorized [technology] center, which was actually quite nice, as it started to 
make us look a lot bigger than we were. Because it was an early adopted technology, you could 
not be a smaller organization, because people would expect early adopters to be big 
organizations. Up until then we‘d just been a group of R&D engineers which did not 
Adm. Sci. 2013, 3 249 
 
 
differentiate us; but as soon as we became an authorized [technology] center, we had the classic 
USP.‖—Marketing Director of Finance-Software. 
As a result, a perception is constructed among INV‘s outside stakeholders as being a large  
and important player in the newly created market, and at the same time it gives that INV a source  
for differentiation. 
4.2. Market Legitimation Strategy  
With an IP and with the understanding of the need and/or desire to develop a product-led business, 
entrepreneurs are then faced with the quest to better understand the target market, and how to get the 
product to that market; as some entrepreneurs put it: “who is going to use [our product]?” (CEO of 
Finance-Software), or “where can [our product] be used?” (CEO of Tool-Software); hence, the issue 
of market legitimacy arises. Market legitimacy is about conveying to stakeholders that the INV has the 
market-related capabilities to operate effectively in its industry [42]. According to the data, in order to 
acquire market legitimacy, entrepreneurs may bring in non-executives, and/or advisors with rich 
experience in marketing and sales to serve on the board or as marketing or sales operating officers: 
―We had experience in selling our consulting services, backed up by our technical credibility; 
selling a product was a completely different thing. We did not have any background in that; that 
is why we looked for a non-exec in that particular area; someone who actually sold products 
worldwide.‖—CEO of Project-Software. 
―Getting advisors on board helps companies to get the money; but partly would be to fill in the 
expertise gaps; also they would be called in to demonstrate a kind of endorsement: the bigger the 
name of the adviser, the bigger the impression they would make on VCs, kind of window 
dressing if you like.‖—Business Strategy Consultant. 
At the same time, entrepreneurs engage large consulting companies or strategic advisors with 
intimate knowledge of the local investor community to aid them in the process of fund raising. The 
acquisition of venture capital, hence the presence of a VC or VC syndicate on the board, enhances the 
INV market legitimacy. Grounded in data, there also emerged the referral from powerful enterprises as 
a means to endorse the INV and its innovation.  
―The key to raising venture capital money is to make sure you bring people on board who 
actually help the company. I liked working with investors and when we opened the office in the 
US we got all the support we could get.‖—CEO of Data-Software. 
―The key things that make people buy, particularly in B2B market, are if they can refer to 
somebody else who‘s bought from you, and that reference would normally be within the same 
sector.‖—CEO of Finance-Software. 
―We signed up [a large consulting company] to assist us in raising funds from three venture 
capitalists. We also have as a sales and marketing director the former vice-president of sales of a 
large enterprise player, and, as a chairman, the former general manager of another large 
enterprise player.‖—CEO of Mobile-Software 
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The data further point to external factors that are beyond an entrepreneur‘s control, but which 
contribute to market legitimation, for example, regulative or normative pressures [50]. To illustrate, an 
opportunity might be regulatory driven, rather than economically driven when increased regulation in 
the financial sector forces financial institutions to continuously adopt e- and internet-based solutions 
for their businesses; as one of the interviewees put it: 
―There are two ways to make a donkey to move, i.e., either to flutter an herb in front of it or hit it 
with a stick from the back… We found that stick and it worked.‖—Marketing Director of 
Finance-Software 
The findings also reveal several challenges that await entrepreneurs in the pursuit of market 
legitimacy, especially when non-execs, advisors, or investors are sought and later brought on board. 
The most challenging for an entrepreneur is to sell his or her idea to new business partners, and to 
justify the best course of action as perceived by the entrepreneur. This is due to the fact that decisions 
related to starting an INV, or investing in such a venture, were made under conditions of technology 
and market uncertainty, that is, when the possible outcomes of such decisions and the probability of 
those outcomes were unknown [23], and market signals were not reliable [24–26]. Such uncertain 
decision-making settings have a snowball, most of the time negative, effect on the process of 
developing congruence between entrepreneurs‘ and new business partners‘ goals [51]. This is how 
entrepreneurs described their experiences in the pursuit of market legitimacy: gut feeling, loss of 
control, loss of agility, stifle the growth, imposed their agenda [of rapid internationalization] on us, 
possible collision between advisors and investors, to name a few. 
4.3. Operating Legitimation Strategy  
To mitigate this kind of challenges, the data suggest that entrepreneurs should turn their attention to 
the acquisition of operating legitimacy. Through operating legitimacy, entrepreneurs aim to convey to 
their stakeholders that the INV has, given the circumstances, an optimal organizational gestalt, which 
consists of mutually supportive organizational system elements combined with appropriate resources 
and behavioral patterns [52]. This might be the toughest legitimation strategy to acquire for the high-
technology entrepreneurs; as the liquidator explained: 
―Technology businesses might be very good at generating sales, but a lot of them are not; a lot of 
them are operating on the expectations for the future; and what they do is they create a structure 
that in my view is too ambitious; it is ahead of itself in terms of the maturity of the business. In 
some ways entrepreneurs are a lot more amateur in their management style. They can be 
extremely naïve about how they have to deal with their new ventures.‖ 
In the process of acquiring operating legitimacy, entrepreneurs are concerned, inter alia, with 
establishing an office, hiring employees, developing internal policies and operating procedures, 
developing incentive mechanisms to stimulate efficiency, attracting customers and generating first 
sales, as well as getting business and management education – all these being a new realm for most 
entrepreneurs as the quotes below illustrate:  
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―We felt there was a need to establish more of a real company; we had to hire full time 
development staff, establish an office. The fact that we had to hire staff brought all these issues 
of how to motivate staff: we got the best out of them, treated them properly, and did all the 
things you have to do professionally to have staff; and taking on board the office and other 
additional overheads.‖—CEO of Project-Software. 
―For our employees that was not a difficult transition; it was something that they grew up with to 
some extent from universities when this technology started to emerge… We had a profit scheme 
where we shared some of our profits with all the staff. What we started thinking about was how 
we could actually develop a market focused proposition... Changing in thinking was also 
promoted in some way by two of the key executives by getting an MBA.‖—CEO of  
Finance-Software. 
―I often wondered whether we went to too many markets. Customer base was very important; 
product was quite important, because while we were building our own platform, we could still 
deploy their existing products; it meant that we had revenues; so acquiring customer base was 
good; acquiring the legacy product was good; and the knowledge of customer needs; the 
development skills were not good; and actually their sales, in terms of scale were not good.‖—CEO 
of Mobile-Software.  
―We raised more money than we actually needed… I think if we had fewer resources, we would 
have made better decisions. The pressure was to invest it and the objective was not to do it as 
cheaply as possible; but to move as quickly as possible... As a relatively new company, when 
recruiting so many people so quickly and in so many different parts, you have to make sure that 
everybody understood the vision of what we were trying to accomplish. It was also quite difficult 
when your customers are in US, but your product development team was back in UK.‖—CEO of 
Data-Software. 
The emergent nature of the market an INV operates in makes the acquisition of operational 
legitimacy more imperative (quadrant I, Figure 1), and more challenging. In such uncertain  
decision-making settings, values and norms, and binding expectations are also in the process of 
emergence, and entrepreneurs and their key stakeholders (e.g., VCs) learn as they go. Moreover, such 
an emerging environment dominated by information asymmetry is conducive to mistrust and goal 
misalignment between entrepreneurs and VCs [51]. Having the right management team becomes 
critical to the success of the venture, as the venture capitalist reiterated:  
―In the round one VCs are looking for pre-product; round two is the product, and some reference 
customers; round three is you‘ve got revenue of millions of pounds. If you have pre-product, 
pre-customer and your management is weak, you won‘t get a funding. VCs need an excellent 
management team when there is no product or customers.‖ 
4.4. Locational Legitimation Strategy  
Through locational strategy entrepreneurs aim to achieve several legitimation objectives. One, by 
locating their offices abroad, entrepreneurs aim to overcome the disadvantage of foreignness [53] so 
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that their ventures are perceived as a venture from a target market, e.g., an American company or a 
European player and/or as a venture that conforms to similar rules, norms and values [8], e.g., by 
locating in Silicon Valley, California or Silicon Glen, Scotland. As interviewed entrepreneurs explained: 
―We opened an office in Silicon Valley so that we can make the company look like an American 
company to the American market. We also opened two other in different US locations; now 
we‘re just two miles away from our strategic partner.‖—CEO of Data-Software. 
―To enter the enterprise market we had to be perceived as a European, not UK player. And we 
designed the company that way from day one.‖—CEO of Mobile-Software. 
―One of the keys to the enterprise market was that it was very much populated by very big 
players so we had to look big.‖—Marketing director of Finance-Software. 
Two, by locating abroad or at least by explicitly stating their intentions to locate abroad, 
entrepreneurs send a signal to prospective investors that a venture has a potential for very high gains in 
combination with the availability of early exit strategies. At the end of the day, by locating abroad, 
entrepreneurs increase the likelihood of receiving venture funding; as one VC explained it:  
―Businesses that we typically backed are businesses which need to sell internationally. We will 
not typically back a business if it is not addressing the world market.‖ 
4.5. Alliance Legitimation Strategy  
Alliance legitimation strategy emerged as a paradox, with conflicting findings. On one side, the 
findings are consistent with those from the literature, whereby INVs mitigate the risk of newness by 
entering international cooperative agreements, partnerships, and joint-ventures [54] with larger,  
well-established companies, with the aim of increasing their visibility, reputation, image, and  
prestige [55–58]. Such business connections with large firms are likely to mitigate the liability of 
outsidership [59] and eventually increase the probability of attaining the legitimacy threshold [60] as 
the quotes below show: 
―The funny thing is that nothing was actually signed with [our strategic partner]; it was almost a 
gentlemen‘s agreement. Wanting to go ahead of the game, they were trying to adopt and launch 
additional SIM capability and they needed tools to test it on mobile phones.‖—CEO of  
Tool-Software. 
―The goal really was to find out partners that could help us to break into the US. Because we had 
fairly new technology, we tried to get some help from some of the big enterprise players, like 
Microsoft, and Oracle. We talked to some of them, and decided to partner with [our strategic 
partner] with whom we had more tractions than we did with [the other]; we felt we could co-
exist alongside [our strategic partner].‖—CEO of Data-Software.  
―Ultimately to really get the product somewhere you have to sell it through a US company; we 
sell now to a large defense company; we have a good image, even perceived by our clients as a 
big company.‖—CEO of Project-Software. 
  
Adm. Sci. 2013, 3 253 
 
 
―We wanted to go into enterprise space; we needed a bit of track record and credibility. We had 
to get into some relationships with a big player.‖—Marketing director of Finance-Software. 
―We could‘ve done more to develop relationships with [our strategic partner]; but if we 
succeeded, we would‘ve been just swallowed up, or kicked in one side. So, we could not have 
grown the business to the extent that we wanted to independently. It was a tradeoff.‖—CEO of 
Mobile-Software.  
On the other side, the data point to the opposite effect that the alliance legitimation strategy has on 
the process of international new venture legitimation. For example, what entrepreneurs discovered was 
that large enterprise players demand exclusive partnerships, thus making them captive to such 
relationships, with no practicable alternative but to sell their products via a single enterprise player [35]. 
This effect questions Johanson and Vahlne‘s ([59], p. 1411) conjecture that ―… insidership in relevant 
network(s) is necessary for successful internationalization‖. This is how entrepreneurs described such 
(insidership) relationships: spooking, lot of clouds, seriously bad company, bandits, and Venus flytrap. 
4.6. Anchoring Legitimation Strategy  
Anchoring as a type of legitimation strategy emerged later in the coding process. Initially, during 
the process of open coding, hype as In Vivo code was used to conceptualize this kind of behavior, as 
the following quotes demonstrate:  
―When I look at the business plan at forecasts to get the initial funding, I can say straight away: 
this is ridiculous, absolutely ridiculous, there is no way the company could grow at that pace… 
The whole trust… if a young technology business is to create large expectations about sales and 
profits levels, it is kind of hyping and this is how entrepreneurs generate VC money.‖ 
—Liquidator. 
―The hype is important as it creates fashion; hype is driven by fashion. If you like, hype and 
fashion are the two sides of the same coin. So, if everyone is doing what is fashionable, then by 
definition, everybody is doing it. The hype releases the investment decisions because they reduce 
the pain of failure.‖—Strategic advisor. 
Going back to the literature helped identify anchoring as a theoretical code [20]. Anchoring is 
viewed as being one of the strongest and most prevalent of cognitive biases [46]. It refers to a situation 
in which decision makers, under organizational pressures, and when forecasts are critical in attracting 
funding, have big incentives to accentuate the positive and downplay the negative in laying out 
prospective outcomes [46]. Entrepreneurs, in the attempt to attain a legitimacy threshold, may tell 
―legitimacy lies that are intentional misrepresentations of the facts‖ ([61], p. 950). Such cognitive bias 
is amplified under uncertain decision-making settings that are largely characterized, inter alia, by the 
asymmetry of information, as the following quotes exemplify:  
―We always felt it was very important to build up our brand. So, we kind of played the press 
game. To get into papers, you have to give them something. And therefore, you tend to, I would 
say, make up things; you have to exaggerate things... It is like building people‘s expectations.‖ – 
CEO of Finance-Software. 
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―Our business plan was a bit ambitious, not to say the least, is the reality of it. We knew it was a 
bit ambitious as well, but you have to pitch in that fashion in order to secure any investment at 
all. VCs themselves encouraged this approach and this type of statements.‖—CEO of  
Project-Software. 
―…the second round funding will support our rapid expansion in a sector currently  
valued at $10 billion; however, it is estimated that by 2003 the sector will be worth $150bn… 
Hype, for us, was about timing. At a time people were grossly exaggerating things.‖—CEO of 
Data-Software. 
―We had to construct the business plan that would give the investors the rates of return to buy 
them into; so, we had to construct something that would say that we could do it for 15 million. 
And in the hindsight, that may not have been the best way of going about it.‖—CEO of  
Mobile-Software. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions  
This study explored in depth how INVs acquire legitimacy during the process of their emergence. It 
employed critical incident technique in order to capture critical events that entrepreneurs faced during 
the legitimation process. Grounded in data, the study makes several contributions to INV legitimation 
theory on one hand, and to legitimation theory on the other. First, the study supports a number of 
legitimation strategies yielded by prior research, namely market, locational, and alliance legitimation 
strategies. At the same time, the study found no support for other legitimation strategies suggested by 
the extant literature, namely historical and scientific legitimation strategies [42]. This latter result 
should be treated with caution, since the sample selected for this study was confined to INVs in which 
the emergence of the international opportunity coincided with the emergence of a venture as a 
legal/operational entity. In other words, the legitimation process starts before or immediately after the 
inception of a new venture, that is, when an entrepreneur has identified and commenced the pursuit of 
a new (international) opportunity, and the new venture, for the most part, has neither internal nor 
external legitimacy. Should the focus of research have been on INVs from an intrapreneurship 
perspective, scientific and historical legitimation strategies would have played an important role in the 
process of INV legitimation along with the other legitimation strategies.  
Second, the study further contributes to our understanding of INV legitimation by suggesting new 
types of legitimation strategies, mainly technology, operating, and anchoring. Technology legitimation 
strategy aims to validate an innovation or technology that has been created to meet a need or solve a 
problem, and targets large enterprise players on the assumption that they could become early adopters 
of that technology. Technology legitimation could be achieved by recruiting key technical or 
engineering personnel, via certification, and/or development of built-in capability [62]. The biggest 
challenge in the pursuit of this legitimacy is to find early adopters that are willing to try the  
new technology.  
Through operating legitimacy, INVs aim to convey to their stakeholders, especially potential 
investors, that these ventures have optimal organizational gestalt, are efficient and professional. This 
could be achieved, inter alia, by registering a legal entity, establishing an office, hiring employees, 
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developing internal policy and operating procedures (including incentives mechanisms), fostering 
business education among entrepreneur-owners and top management, and completing a business  
plan [9]. Given that these INVs emerge in an uncertain environment (quadrant I, Figure 1), the key 
challenge entrepreneurs face in this endeavor is to set up and commit to long-term outcome goals, 
respectively, and to develop performance benchmarks that, however, may lead to goal misalignment 
between entrepreneurs and their backers [51,63]. Entrepreneurs may mitigate such issues in uncertain 
decision-making settings by developing and pursuing just procedures that are valued by VCs and other 
key stakeholders that are associated with long-term venture performance [64,65].  
Anchoring legitimation strategy aims to increase the likelihood of attracting venture funding and 
other resources by intentionally misrepresenting the facts about the INV potential. In an uncertain 
decision-making setting, asymmetry of information is created as entrepreneurs are the only ones who 
posse intimate knowledge about the technology or INV potential. Anchoring legitimation strategy 
could be achieved by hyping the business plan, accentuating the positive while downplaying the 
negative [46], stretching the rules [66], or telling legitimacy lies [61]. In addition to the risk of  
getting less funding as stakeholders learn more about the INV potential, there is an ethical issue 
associated with this legitimation strategy. From the legitimation theory perspective, the findings 
related to the anchoring legitimation strategy raise interesting research questions, for example, do 
ethical considerations or stretching the rules moderate the process of legitimation or do they set the 
(ethical) boundaries of the legitimation theory?  
As this study was concerned with INV legitimation in emerging industries (quadrant I, Figure 1), it 
is conjectured that these legitimation strategies are time dependent. That is, with elapsed time and with 
growing experience and knowledge, INVs and industries they operate in transition from an uncertain 
decision-making setting (quadrant I, Figure 1) to a risk decision-making setting (quadrant II, Figure 1). 
In other words, the main sources of uncertainty, such as technical uncertainty, market uncertainty, and 
goal ambiguity, fade away or are lessened with elapsed time, as the following quote from a  
VC exemplifies: 
―…the market was extremely bullish, and investors were willing to take very large risks; also, 
we had an inflated idea of what companies might be worth. The big thing that we‘ve been 
working on quite hard to improve was to get the views on the size and trends of the markets. For 
example, in [the] case of Project-Software, we did not have that level of information and found 
out the market was actually much smaller than we thought.‖ 
Following from the above, uncertainty could be seen as a boundary-determining criterion [21,67] of 
INV legitimation that emerged as a dynamic, at times belligerently so, non-linear process (Table 3). 
Following Dubin ([21], p. 96), who argues that ―… empirically relevant theory in the behavioral and 
social sciences is built upon the acceptance of the notion of relationship rather than of the notion of 
causality‖, future theory-building research is suggested to improve our understanding of relationship 
between the legitimation strategies and then to seek to improve prediction.  
Third, the study makes an attempt to further our understanding of the legitimacy threshold  
concept that extant literature refers to as a tipping point [68], or a certain ceiling [22], or as a made it  
feeling [60] at which the INV can achieve further gains in legitimacy and resources [6], or at which 
legitimacy is no longer an issue, with competition being the primary concern [22]. The actual lack of 
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extant research on legitimacy threshold may suggest that it is an elusive phenomenon that ―… exists 
[but] … is difficult to identify and probably unique to each new venture‖ ([6], p. 428).  
The findings that emerged in this study in relation to legitimation strategies suggest several pointers 
for future scholarly discussion about, and research on, the legitimacy threshold. The study findings 
suggest that the legitimacy threshold is rather a summative unit of the legitimation theory, a unit that 
draws ―… together a number of different properties of a thing‖ and has ―the property that derives from 
the interaction among a number of other properties‖ ([21], p. 66). The proposed view on the 
summative unit of the theory of legitimation builds on the assumption that legitimacy is continuously 
constructed and reconstructed in an attempt to maintain an alignment with the changing institutional 
environment [69]. It is, thus, conjectured that the legitimacy threshold emerges as a result of 
interaction among a number of legitimation strategies, seen as an effect of several tipping points, e.g., 
the technology legitimacy threshold, market legitimacy threshold, or operating legitimacy threshold. 
From the latter conjecture it follows that the legitimacy threshold is a process rather a clear-cut 
dichotomous phenomenon. It may further be argued that, during this process, critical events play an 
important role as they contribute to the acquisition of a certain type of legitimacy, be it technology, 
operating, or alliance legitimacy. The above inferences clearly will have an impact on the way the 
levels and units of analysis are defined in an attempt to empirically investigate the process of the 
emergence of the legitimacy threshold. For example, cross sectional or longitudinal research may be 
conducted across and/or within various types of legitimation strategies.  
Fourth, the study, in the tradition of contextualizing theory-building research [70], delineates the 
domain of scholarly research on legitimation (Figure 1) and positions within it the research on INVs 
(quadrants I and II, Figure 1). This intersection between legitimation theory and INV theory opens up a 
promising research agenda. For example, researchers may explore not only how and why INVs acquire 
legitimacy, but also how INVs contribute to the creation and legitimation of the new, emerging sector 
of an economy (quadrant I) or how INVs change and shape the legitimation of an existing sector of an 
economy (quadrant II). 
Researchers may delve into how INVs transition from one quadrant to another. Here the velocities 
with which INVs and markets emerge play an important role. For example, if an INV legitimates faster 
than the market it operates in, a longitudinal research would observe that INV moving from quadrant I 
to quadrant IV would be primarily concerned, for example, with how to defend its legitimacy in an 
attempt to contribute to further legitimation of the industry it operates in, to de-legitimize, or leave that 
market. If a new sector legitimates faster than an INV from that sector, then, from quadrant I, the INV 
will move to quadrant II where it should instead continue its legitimation efforts in the risk  
decision-making setting that distinguishes quadrant II from quadrant I.  
Concurrent legitimation of an INV and the sector it operates in will allow researchers to observe 
how INVs move from quadrant I to quadrant III where INVs will be concerned with maintaining their 
legitimacy and/or defending it against newcomers. By mapping various INVs (e.g., low tech vs. high 
tech, or from developed countries vs. from emerging countries) onto Figure 1, researchers could 
develop theory about different trajectories that INVs may follow in their attempts to legitimize. This 
would allow researchers and practitioners to delve deeper into how each type of legitimation strategy 
operates. Researchers may also study how established international ventures further create and 
legitimate their products or services in international (emergent) markets, or even how new industries or 
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sectors of an economy are created. Mapping INVs onto Figure 1 would also allow international 
entrepreneurship researchers develop much needed contextualized definitions of INVs [71].  
Given the case study nature of the study, which is based on a small number of observations, the 
above-identified directions for future research at the intersection of legitimation theory and INV 
emerging theory would further our understanding of the INV legitimation process. Studying INVs 
through the theoretical lenses of legitimation is a promising area of research that would contribute to 
the advancement of international entrepreneurship theory. 
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Appendix. Critical Event Charts of Case Companies  
Finance-Software 
Year QI QII QIII QIV 
1996 Management buy-out of 
an R&D lab of 
multinational company 
   
 Internationalized instantly 
(USA, Brazil, Europe) 
   
1998 
  
Realized they were 
operating without any 
focus; had incurred losses 
Decided to focus on new, 
emerging technology 
 
  
Identified the need to 
diversify and deliver 
tangible product 
Trained staff in that new 
technology 
 
  
 Re-engineered the work 
for its parent company in 
this new technology 
1999 Decided to focus 100% on 
domestic financial 
services sector 
Became authorized [new 
technology] 
development centre 
  
  Partnered with [MNE] to 
enter the financial 
service market 
  
2000  IT market in the US 
started to collapse 
  
2001 Opened 3 offices 
throughout UK 
IT market started 
worsening in the UK 
Launched the 1st version of 
the product 
 
    Announced as the fasted 
growing company of the 
year 
2002 Was still bullish about its 
growth 
 Forced to cut one sixth of 
staff 
 
2003  
 
Discovered that the product 
is 'at least 12 months to 
soon to the market' 
Decided to 'cocoon' 
  Downsizing continued Retained the IP and key 
personnel 
  
      Waits for the market to 
pick up 
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Project-Software 
Year QI QII QIII QIV 
1992  Started-up as a consulting 
company 
  
1994    Identified new market 
opportunity to diversify 
and deliver tangible 
product 
1995 Started R&D activities     
1997   Launched 1st version of 
the product via a deal 
with OEM 
 
1998 Deal with OEM failed Pitched to VCs to raise 
funds to market the 
product in UK 
 Changed the business plan 
as per VCs request [to 
market to US] 
1999 Received 1st round of 
funding 
 Had to agree with VCs on 
entering the European 
market 
Initiated international 
expansion into Europe and 
the US 
 Hired a marketing non-
exec from the OEM they 
had deal with 
  Established a relationship 
with a master distributor 
to enter European market 
2000 Started exporting the 
product to the US and 
Europe 
IT market in the US 
started to collapse 
Received 2nd round of 
funding 
Marketing non-exec 
stepped down 
  Continued exporting 
efforts and making trips to 
the US 
Continued exporting 
efforts and making trips 
to the US 
Continued exporting 
efforts and making trips to 
the US 
   Abandoned hopes for 
Europe as no sales were 
realized 
VCs appointed their own 
non-exec specializing in 
crisis management 
2001 Signed in the US a joint-
venture deal with a UK 
MNE that had a large US 
customer base 
IT market started 
worsening in the UK 
 
Presented to VCs the plan 
to 'cocoon' 
Bank reconsidered its 
position and offered new 
terms and conditions 
Resurrected: registered as 
new company 
 Developed a 'dramatic 
plan to improve things' to 
be presented to VCs 
The plan to 'cocoon' was 
accepted by all but one 
investor, the bank of the 
company 
Decided that 'the game 
was over' 
Bought over the IP from 
the liquidator, re-
employed senior software 
engineer 
 Were introduced to a 
liquidator in case the 
'dramatic' plan is not 
backed up by VCs 
Approached the liquidator 
to surrender 
Was liquidated Re-branded the software, 
launched its 1st version 
        Re-internationalised 
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Tool-Software 
Year QI QII QIII QIV 
1985  Started-up as a service-based 
company 
  
1991   Won a project to develop 
a smart-card test 
application 
 
   Decided to develop that 
application into a tool 
 
1992 
 
Reached a "gentlemen's 
agreement" with a large telecom 
operator to develop a test tool 
for mobile phones smart-cards 
  
1993 Released its first 
version of the tool 
 Launched 1st version of 
the product via a deal 
with OEM 
 
 Took its first version 
of the tool to Europe 
   
1994  Tried to raise venture capital, but 
with no success 
  
1995 Smart-card 
technology started 
being adopted 
globally 
 Took its products to the 
US 
Moved to profitability 
1999  Opened its first overseas office 
in the US 
 Won a strategic 
contract with one of 
the largest software 
player in the world 
2000 Recession of the IT 
market 
That large software player 
withdrew from the smart-card 
market, and from that strategic 
partnership 
The opportunity that was 
identified was not 
realizing 
Laid-off half of its 
staff, and restructured 
its overseas offices 
 Grew out of the tool 
market 
  Decided to focus back 
on 2G tools and 
services business to 
generate tactical 
revenue 
 Spotted new 
opportunity to 
develop a 3G smart-
card platform for 
telecom and finance 
sectors  
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Tool-Software. Cont. 
Year QI QII QIII QIV 
 Received its first 
round of funding to 
develop the platform 
   
2001 Received its second 
round of funding 
Opened its second overseas 
office: Japan 
  
2002    Received its third 
round of funding 
2003 Had ~ 220 customers 
in 33 countries 
    Released the platform 
Mobile-Software 
Year QI QII QIII QIV 
2000 Market opportunity 
identified 
IT market in the US started 
to collapse 
Started-up  Started the fund raising 
process 
   Internationalized 
instantly via acquisitions 
(Europe, UK, Midle 
East) 
Hyped' the business plan 
to 'buy the investors into' 
    Turned for help to a 
leading market research 
firm and to one of the big 
four firms to comment on 
their market proposition 
2001 Opened offices in Europe, 
Middle East, and Far East 
IT market started to 
worsen in the UK Secured 
first round of funding: got 
1/3 less than 'hyped' 
 Were behind its planned 
revenues and with the 
development of the 
platform 
 
 
Held the board meeting 
with new investors to re-
evaluate the business plan: 
no changes were made 
 Held next board meeting 
and decided to raise 
another £9 million 
2002 One of the investors was 
taken over and withdrew 
from this portfolio 
   
 Another investor pulled 
out as well 
   
 Could not find another 
investors 
   
  Ceased trading       
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Data-Software 
Year QI QII QIII QIV 
1998 VC backed management 
buy-out of an IP and small 
R&D team from a large 
software company 
 Failed to secure a 
strategic partnership with 
one of the leading 
companies in the field 
 
 Used 1st round of funding to 
prove the technology and 
the market 
   
 Started exploring different 
routes to the US market 
   
1999 
 
Achieved brake through 
in product development 
Secured a strategic 
partnership with one of 
the largest software 
companies 
Opened its first overseas 
sales office in the US 
close to its strategic 
partner 
 
 
Failed to secure strategic 
partnership with another 
market leader in 
business intelligence 
  
2000 Received its 2nd round of 
funding to build sales 
infrastructures in the US 
IT market in the US 
started to collapse 
The strategic partner 
announced market 
development plans that 
overlapped with 
company's 
Adhered to the strategy of 
fast, out-and-out growth 
 Opened its 2nd sales office 
in the US 
Refuted several offers 
from trade buyers 
Spooked by that event, 
started thinking and 
talking as to what to do 
Opened another two sales 
offices in the US 
    Re-branded the company 
to align it to the product 
2001 Decision was reached to 
focus on profitability rather 
than on out-and-out growth 
IT market started to 
worsen in the UK 
New CEO could not 
attract new funding 
 
 It was also decided to 
withdraw from the US, 
focus on applications rather 
than products, and on direct 
selling 
 
Ceased trading  
  Lead entrepreneur stepped 
down; VCs brought in new 
CEO to effect new strategy 
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